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I.

Introduction

The idea of state sovereignty is one of the most important and contentious issues in
international law. It is an abstract concept that has evolved over time with important
effects. Many recent and ongoing conflicts, such as those in Southern Sudan, Georgia,
Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Aceh, Iraq, and Bougainville, revolve around the idea of
sovereignty. This article examines the concept of earned sovereignty2 and shows that its
core elements taken alone are a step-by-step approach to keeping disputants involved in
conflict resolution, while its optional elements are parts of a toolkit to be used in
facilitating the step-by-step approach laid out by the core elements of the theory. A
review of recent practice shows that the core elements of earned sovereignty offer a
three-part roadmap for conflict resolution beginning with shared sovereignty, continuing
through institution building, and ending at a determination of final status. Other parts of
the theory, called optional elements, are tools stakeholders in a conflict situation may use
in order to move from one core element to another until a final status solution is obtained.
Though the optional elements of phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and
constrained sovereignty are parts of earned sovereignty they need not always be used. Indepth analysis of the peace agreements in Southern Sudan, Bougainville, and Aceh show
that, while the core elements are implemented throughout, the optional elements are used
to varying degrees and in some instances not at all.
Before delving too deeply into earned sovereignty, Part II of this article examines the
concept of state sovereignty in international law, finding that is an important, if
complicated subject, and makes the point that a step-by-step approach to accumulating
sovereignty such as earned sovereignty is useful in conflict resolution. Part II concludes
by finding that the concept of sovereignty is fluid in practice, and it is this fluidity that
makes it particularly useful.
Part III provides a general discussion of earned sovereignty as an important and
perfectible concept, and uses a bread baking analogy to show the relationships between
the core elements and the optional elements. Part IV demonstrates how those
relationships are expressed in international practice using Southern Sudan, Bougainville,
and Aceh as case studies. Finally, Part V concludes that the core elements alone can
provide a pared-down version of earned sovereignty useful in conflict resolution, while
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the optional elements retain their usefulness as tools to help implement and secure the use
of the core elements.
II.

Sovereignty Is One of The Premier Issues Facing International Law In The
Twenty-First Century

Issues concerning sovereignty of states and substate entities are some of the most
important and complex issues debated in the international legal community today. As
Lorie M. Graham stated, “Let me just close by saying that in the last six weeks I have
heard it twice stated that the defining issue in international law for the 21st century is
finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of
borders [….]”3 Diane Otto agreed that the idea of state sovereignty was a one of
immediate importance, “There is little doubt that states’ sovereignty is being contested by
contemporary developments both locally and supranationally.”4
Though scholars may agree that sovereignty is an important concept, discussions of
sovereignty are often complicated. Sovereignty has been referred to as an imprecise,
subjective term, referring to many different belief systems over time.5 However,
sovereignty retains relevance: functionally as an organizing principle, and politically as a
symbol of national self-identity.6 This belief is affirmed by Dan Sarooshi, who wrote on
the relationship between sovereignty and international organizations, stated that,“[t]he
characterization of sovereignty as an essentially contested concept has an important realworld manifestation in relation to international organizations. He concept of sovereignty
being inherently unstable and in a constant state of having its core criteria subject to
contestation and change has the consequence that there is no single, or indeed
authoritative, definition that can be given to the concept.”7
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Taken at its most simple, the basic rule for international legal sovereignty is that
recognition is extended to entities, states, with territory and formal juridical autonomy.8
Even if one takes a more complicated view of sovereignty as an abstract concept, as a
practical matter, some scholars, including Stephen Krasner, believe that, “Today, stability
requires more than maintaining a balance of power among strong states. Safety […]
depends on the ability of the United States and the international community to make
sovereignty work – to establish democracies that improved the lives of ordinary
individuals rather than of the ruling elite.”9
It is therefore important to study sovereignty, with all its variation, in order to better
understand, prevent, and end conflicts within and among states.
This article bases its arguments regarding sovereignty upon the definition of sovereignty
as a bundle of rights, including external and internal governing rights.10 It is this idea of
sovereignty that allows the theory of earned sovereignty to function.
A. Most Recent Conflicts Revolve Around Sovereignty
Many recent and ongoing conflicts concern the central problem of sovereignty: what are
powers reserved to government; who exercises which of them; and how should they be
exercised?11 If one looks at recent and ongoing conflicts such as those in Southern
Sudan, Bougainville, and Aceh one finds that they revolve around the issues laid out as
external or internal governing rights by Williams and Heymann.
B. A Step-By-Step Approach to Accumulating Sovereignty Is Useful in Conflict
Resolution
Stakeholders involved in many conflict and newly post-conflict situations often do not
know where to begin. Once the peace process begins, the parties have no idea how to
proceed, and progress is often hampered by unclear, divergent objectives that lead to
impasses. In many post-conflict situations conditions go unmet or important steps fail to
8
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take place as scheduled. The importance of formulating strategies to keep disputants
engaged in settlement processes should not be underestimated.12 Recent experience in
peace negotiations has proven that keeping the parties engaged in the development and
implementation of a peace plan is by far the most difficult challenge, hence the
importance of a guideline like earned sovereignty.
The parties themselves, regional organizations, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often must work together to keep peace
negotiations and peace implementation on track. Scholars have proposed, for example,
that the United Nations (UN) could construct a positive sanctions regime to enhance a
given community’s sense of identity.13 If the UN placed more faith in reward-based
strategies clearer rules and regulations governing their use would need to be developed.14
Earned sovereignty fits into this model of conditional engagement and positive sanctions.
The core elements outline a set of steps that show constant rewards for progress in
obtaining, and preserving, peace: sharing sovereignty fosters dialogue between the
stakeholders; institution building fosters competence in the substate entity and provides
both the stakeholders and the international community with assurance of future
competency; determining final status of the substate entity, whether it is autonomy,
independence, or something else entirely, gives the parties an idea of an ultimate reward,
a goal that all parties can attempt to attain.
The optional elements, with the possible exception of constrained sovereignty, keep the
parties on track by rewarding them for tasks accomplished during the implementation
process. Phased sovereignty rewards the substate entity with increased sovereignty over
time. This “timer” on sovereignty rewards the original state with peace for the duration
of the phased sovereignty period. It rewards the substate entity with a gradual delegation
of authority to the substate entity. It rewards both parties with a period of time in which
to continue dialogue and solicit aid from the international community. Conditional
sovereignty again rewards the substate entity with increased sovereignty, this time for
meeting certain conditions using a quid pro quo arrangement. It rewards the original
state with a quid pro quo system that allows the original state to set, to some degree, the
conditions necessary for the substate entity to obtain increased sovereign rights or
powers. Finally, constrained sovereignty rewards the substate entity with increased
sovereignty, though not independence or, necessarily, as much sovereignty as it had
originally desired. The original state is rewarded with restrictions on the conduct of the
substate entity, which could provide, for example, a measure of increased security for the
original state.
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C. The Concept of Sovereignty Is Fluid in Practice
There are numerous articles and books that attempt to define sovereignty and statehood.15
Some even go so far as to argue that sovereignty, by its very nature, is undefinable, and it
is that very lack of definition that gives the intellectual discussion surrounding the
concept such great importance.16 For example, a recent article in The Economist showed
that many Western diplomats think that it is unrealistic for Serbia to retain any kind of
link to Kosovo. Some are mulling the idea of conditional independence, which would
break the link with Serbia and replace the present UN mission with a new body that
would have considerable reserve powers to keep the province under tight international
control for years to come.17 The idea of conditional independence, similar to that of
earned sovereignty, takes the idea of sovereignty out of its strict historical sense, and
lends credence to the theory that a modern idea of sovereignty involves the distribution of
a bundle of rights.
III.

Earned Sovereignty Is an Important and Perfectible Concept; Optional
Elements Are Means To The End of Achieving Final Status

This section will show that the concept of earned sovereignty, when pared down to the
core elements, offers a step-by-step approach to using a reward-based system to keep
disputants engaged in settlement processes. It will further demonstrate how, in practice,
the optional elements are in fact parts of a toolkit to be used in facilitating the step-bystep approach laid out by the core elements of the theory.
A. Core Elements: Shared Sovereignty, Institution Building, and Determination of
Final Status as Eggs, Flour, and Bread as an End Product
The core elements, outlined in this section, are the indispensable components in the stepby-step process of conflict resolution through earned sovereignty. The first step is
delegation of certain responsibilities to the substate entity in shared sovereignty. The
second step involves an increase in the capacity of the substate entity to undertake those
responsibilities through institution building. Finally, the third step, determination of final
status, involves determining a level of responsibility to be exercised by the substate entity
that will satisfy the original state, the substate entity, and the international community.
15
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The entire process could be analogized to baking bread. The parties must begin with
eggs and flour and desire the baking process to result in bread.
i.

Shared Sovereignty: the Eggs

Each case of earned sovereignty is characterized by an initial stage of shared sovereignty,
whereby the state, the substate entity, and possibly the international community may
exercise some sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory.18 Which parties
exercise what parts of sovereignty over the substate entity varies from case to case. For
example, in Kosovo, though Serbia retains legal sovereignty over the province it has been
administered by the United Nations for years, with some authority delegated to a local
government.19 In other situations, such as Bougainville, sovereignty is shared between
the state and the substate entity, without any administrative authority being ceded to the
international community.20 This still allows for the participation of the international
community in a supporting role.21
ii.

Institution Building: the Flour

The substate entity, frequently with the assistance of the international community,
undertakes to construct new institutions for self-government, or modify those already in
existence, to develop the institutional capacity for exercising increased sovereign
authority.22 This institution building often takes place during the period of shared
sovereignty and sometimes prior to the determination of final status. It can come in many
forms, from the creation of new administrative organizations, as is currently happening in
Southern Sudan, to the modification of already existing institutions, such as the Public
Service of Bougainville, discussed infra. The methods of institution building are
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the need for the new institutions
to aid in the reconciliation process and possibly implementing confidence-building
measures in order to bring a satisfactory settlement to the conflict.
iii.

Final Status: Bread as an End Product

The third core element is the determination of the final status of the substate entity and its
relationship to the parent state, which is invariably conditioned on the consent of the
international community based upon international recognition.23 This element may be
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decided at any time during the peace process: before an agreement is signed, in the
agreement itself, or after implementation of the agreement.
B. Optional Elements as Means to Achieving the End of Final Status: the Timer, the
Yeast and Counting Calories
In the original presentation of earned sovereignty certain processes were attached to the
core elements and were termed optional elements.24 The optional elements of phased
sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained sovereignty are outlined below.
Section C, infra, will discuss how the optional elements are not specific parts necessary
for a conflict resolution scenario to be termed earned sovereignty. Instead, they are tools
used to move from one core element to another, eventually arriving at a determination of
final status.
i.

Phased Sovereignty: The Timer

Phased sovereignty entails the accumulation by the substate entity of increasing
sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time prior to the
determination of final status.25 An example would be setting a specified time for a
referendum on independence and, until the date of the referendum, allowing the substate
entity participation in the national government so that it could gain competency and
experience within a pre-determined timeframe.26 Application of phased sovereignty to
the conflicts between Sudan and Southern Sudan, Papua New Guinea and Bougainville,
and the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are discussed in
Section IV.
Phased sovereignty is the timer in the bread baking analogy. Once the ingredients are
mixed – at least two parties, shared sovereignty, and institution building – they are put in
the oven of phased sovereignty and the timer is set. While the international community
waits, and possibly participates in institution building, the processes take place that will
eventually produce a final status solution acceptable to all stakeholders
ii.

Conditional Sovereignty: The Yeast

Conditional sovereignty may be applied to the accumulation of increased sovereign
authority by the substate entity, or it may be applied as a set of standards to be achieved
prior to the determination of the substate entity’s final status.27 The first manifestation of
this tool involves a quid pro quo arrangement between the two parties. The example of
the Roadmap to Peace in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict springs readily to mind. The
Roadmap is set out as a “performance-based plan” under which the parties must perform
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certain obligations in order to ensure progress through the different phases of the plan.28
Failure to comply with obligations impedes progress under the Roadmap.29 The second
manifestation of this tool involves the substate entity fulfilling a number of criteria, with
the eventual return on their investment being a determination of final status.
To once again use a cooking analogy, conditional sovereignty is like using certain critical
ingredients to make a dish. The quid pro quo aspect is embodied in the idea that if one
wants to make chocolate chip cookies one must use chocolate chips. The important
factor is the use of chocolate chips. If the baker fails to use chocolate chips plain cookies
result. The second interpretation of conditional sovereignty, which involves fulfilling a
number of steps before attaining final status, could be analogized to making an entire
three-course meal, advertising chocolate chip cookies as dessert. If the host forgets to
add the chocolate chips the guests may leave disappointed.
iii.

Constrained Sovereignty: Counting Calories

The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, consists of applying limitations on
the sovereign authority and functions of the new state.30 In analyzing instances of
constrained sovereignty it is especially useful to think of sovereignty as a bundle of
rights. For an entity to be entirely “sovereign,” when using the bundle of rights theory, it
must possess all of the external and internal governing rights described in Section II. In
constrained sovereignty some of the governing rights are not devolved to the substate
entity. Instead, they are retained by the original state or, in some instances, transferred to
the international community.
Going back to the bread analogy, constrained sovereignty is what happens when, for
whatever reason, the parties bake too little bread. The parties have added all the right
ingredients, the bread cooked for the appropriate time, they followed all the appropriate
steps in the recipe, and now it is ready to eat. The bread is perfectly good but there is too
little of it. It may be necessary for each party to get less bread than they had hoped to
ensure that all parties get a piece, whether that decision is taken amongst the parties
themselves or imposed by an outside facilitator (the host of the party, to follow the
analogy). Most would agree, however, that it is better to have some bread than none at
all.
C. Optional Elements are Means to the End of Final Status
The optional elements of earned sovereignty, as outlined above, are therefore tools to
facilitate the transition from one core element to another, with the eventual goal of
determining an acceptable final status for the substate entity. To continue the analogy
above, final status is the ability to eat bread. It is the ability to exercise mutually
28
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acceptable levels of whatever may be called “sovereignty” by the state, the substate
entity, and the international community.
IV.

Demonstrative Cases

Earned sovereignty is currently being used, in practice if not in name, in a number of
conflict and post-conflict situations around the world.31 In order to illustrate the breadth
of its use, and the diverse ways in which its core and optional elements can be used, or
interpreted as being used, the author has chosen to examine the peace agreements that
have been, and are being, implemented in Southern Sudan, Bougainville, and Aceh.
These conflicts were selected because they resulted in peace agreements that were
relatively successful and could therefore serve as guides to the future application of
earned sovereignty.
A.

Sudan

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of
Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) marked the
conclusion of a 21-year civil war that cost the lives of 1.5 million people.32
As an introduction, it is important to note that the CPA is a name given to a collection of
other Agreements and Protocols including, but not limited to, the Machakos Protocol, the
Agreement on Security Arrangements, and the Protocol on Power Sharing.33 For that
reason the CPA is certainly the most complicated peace agreement examined in this
article, if not one of the most Byzantine drafted in recent memory. In order to provide
specific examples of the CPA’s provisions, particularly as they relate to the theory of
earned sovereignty and the concept of sovereignty as a bundle of rights, this article will
focus on the Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing dated 26 May
2004. In order to provide for ease of understanding the author will continue to refer to
the agreement generally as the CPA.
The CPA, specifically the portion noted above, is replete with examples of all the
elements of earned sovereignty. It satisfies the core elements because it contains
numerous examples of shared sovereignty and institution building and provides specific
means for the determination of final status. It also contains examples of all three of the
optional elements: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained
sovereignty. Interestingly, and importantly, a number of the provisions do not fit neatly
31
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into the above categories. Instead, a number of them are hybrids of two (or more) of the
elements that make up earned sovereignty.
The CPA contains multiple examples of shared sovereignty.34 Perhaps the most
important example, in terms of the political landscape of both the Sudan and Southern
Sudan, is process outlined by the parties, and followed by them, in drafting an interim
constitution. In April 2005 the National Constitution Review Commission convened to
draft the Interim National Constitution, which was ratified July 6, 2005.35 The National
Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) is a body made up of representatives of both
stakeholders tasked with drafting the interim constitution prior to the election of regional
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assemblies, particularly in Southern Sudan.36 A second equally important example is the
institution of the Presidency. Under the terms of the CPA the institution of the
Presidency shall be composed of the President, the First Vice President, and the Vice
President.37 Subsequent negotiations determined that the First Vice President shall be the
President of Southern Sudan. Following the death of Dr. John Garang, Salva Kiir was
made the president of Southern Sudan and is currently acting as First Vice President of
Sudan.38 Under the system developed in the CPA the President shall take some decisions
with the consent of the First Vice President.39 This executive structure therefore provides
an important and potentially powerful example of shared sovereignty, in which the
national government cannot act without the consent of the substate entity.
The CPA similarly contains many examples of institution building. Most of the
institutions of the newly created government of Southern Sudan must be cut from whole
cloth.40 The CPA specifically calls for the establishment of no less than twenty-one new
institutions at the state and national levels.41 The National Electoral Commission, the
National Assembly, the Institution of the Presidency, the Human Rights Commission, the
Constitutional Court, and the Judiciary of Southern Sudan are just a few examples of new
institutions created by the CPA.42
The international community in particular has recognized the importance of institution
building since the signing of the CPA.43 In his report on the Sudan from January 2005,
some six months after the signing of the CPA’s Protocols, United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan (Secretary General Annan) stated that the assistance of the UN
36
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http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpamonitor/cpaMonitor_may06.pdf (last visited January 30, 2007).
39
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, Activity 20.
40
International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead (2006), at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/106_sudan_comprehensive_peace_agr
eement_long_road_ahead_web.doc (last visited Jul. 11, 2006) (“With more than 50 national bodies and
commissions to be formed, multiple systems and levels of governments (with the GOSS and southern state
governments to be formed almost from scratch), the parties, partners and observers are understandably
overwhelmed.”).
41
See generally Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34.
42
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, Activities 9, 12, 15, 36,
37, and 52.
43
See Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2005/57, at 7 (2005).
(To avoid these risks, strong and concerted strategies at both the national and international
levels are required. The Sudanese leadership, in collaboration with the international
community, will need to identify ways to prevent competing interests from derailing the
process. To promote the inclusive implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
the new Sudanese leadership will have to promote its acceptance beyond its immediate
constituencies to the wider body politic and civil society. The new Government must take the
lead, with the help of the international community, in starting to restore confidence and
reconciliation in an all-inclusive national process.)
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should be an all-inclusive national process. The UN mission, he said, should work with
the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), including in the area of policy formation and
planning. A high-level representative of the UN mission should be present at all times in
Southern Sudan.44 The Secretary General also said that the UN mission should include a
public information component to assist the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the
GOSS in providing an effective information capacity.45 A civilian police component
should advise and assist both stakeholders in re-examining roles and functions [of police]
and reviewing methods of operation.46 The rule of law section would be tasked to work
with international partners to support legislative, executive and judicial institutions of
GNU and Southern Sudan, including good offices and technical assistance in areas such
as constitutional development and the strengthening of institutions and systems.47
Finally, the section of the UN mission responsible for human rights should work with
both parties to develop a local capacity including establishment of a Human Rights
Commission.48
44

See id at 12
(While the mission’s headquarters would be based in Khartoum, a special office would be
established in Rumbek, which would relocate should the government of southern Sudan decide to
move its capital to another location. This office would be charged with working with the
government of southern Sudan, as well as managing the peace support operation, including policy
formation and planning in the south. Pending a final decision on the mission’s management
structure for the interim period, at least one of the four members of the mission’s senior leadership
(namely, my Special Representative, his two deputies and the Force Commander) would be
present at all times in southern Sudan.).
45
See id at 13
(The public information component of this mission would seek to offer a clear, impartial, reliable
and credible voice and information source for all stakeholders in the peace process. The
component would further assist the Government of National Unity and the government of southern
Sudan by providing an effective information capacity, including through local and national radio,
television and newspaper outlets, in order to promote understanding of the peace process and the
role a United Nations peace support operation would play among local communities and the
parties.).
46
See id at 15
(The civilian police component of the mission would work in close collaboration within bilateral
international partners to advise and assist existing government police structures and the SPLM/A
police force as they re-examined their roles and functions and reviewed their methods of operation
to move away from military-style policing, which evolved in wartime, towards a style involving
direct interaction with the community.).
47
See id at 16
(The rule of law component would ensure that the peace support operation was able to work
closely with other international partners to support the establishment and operation of essential
legislative, executive and judicial institutions of the Government of National Unity as well as the
government of southern Sudan. Accordingly, the rule of law component would offer good offices
advice and technical assistance to support key processes in a number of areas, including
constitutional development and the strengthening of legislative, judicial and correctional
institutions and systems.).
48
See id at 16-17
(The human rights component of the peace support operation would work with the parties to
develop and strengthen national and local capacity for the protection and promotion of human
rights, including the development of an independent and effective national Human Rights
Commission, which would be of particular importance. The human rights component, working
closely with the rule of law component and other international partners, would also assist national
stakeholders in the development of a transitional justice strategy in accordance with the lessons
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In June 2006, Secretary General Annan delivered another report to the Security Council
on the Sudan.49 In it, he noted that the parties continued to make slow progress towards
full implementation of the CPA and that, while the main structures are in place, many of
the commissions charged with overseeing the implementation process are not being used
effectively.50 Problems still exist with the formation and deployment of Joint Integrated
Units.51 He expressed optimism in that Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers were being redeployed on schedule, that the
Ceasefire Joint Military Committee met regularly, and that the Assessment and
Evaluation Commission has formed four working groups.52 He noted that a number of
important commissions have yet to meet, and that though the membership of the National
Constitutional Review Commission has been chosen, its original directive of ensuring the
independence of CPA institutions was omitted from its new mandate.53 The United
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had intensified efforts aimed at promoting
reconciliation and conflict resolution in Southern Sudan, though tensions were increasing
and its efforts were limited by various constraints.54 In March 2006 UNMIS assisted the
GOSS in organizing its first review of rule of law institutions in Southern Sudan, and
continued to provide policy expertise and support for reform of correctional institutions
in the Sudan.55
Secretary General Annan reported that in March 2006 the Sudan Consortium, which was
organized by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF), and
the UN, brought together representatives of the GNU, the GOSS, and 22 donor countries
in Paris.56 Though donors again expressed support for a Multi-Donor Trust Fund
managed by the World Bank disbursement remained very slow.57
In his concluding observations, the Secretary General emphasized that the greatest
challenge for Southern Sudan was creation of a true peace dividend. He believed that the
prospects for long-term stability would suffer if the gap between peace and a tangible
improvement in peoples living conditions was not bridged. In order for this to occur, he
believed that the international community must ensure the provision of adequate
resources for reconstruction and development.58

learned and experience identified in my report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict
and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616).).
49
See generally Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2006/426 (2006).
50
Id at 1.
51
Id.
52
Id at 2.
53
Id.
54
Id at 4.
55
Id at 7.
56
Id at 9.
57
Id.
58
Id at 12.
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The third core element of earned sovereignty, determination of final status, will be
determined by referendum, tentatively scheduled for 2011.59 Activity 1 in the CPA is
broadly titled “Self determination Referendum for the people of South Sudan” and sets
forth that a referendum will take place six months prior to the end of the Interim Period.60
Per the Machakos Protocol, the Interim Period is a period of six years following the PreInterim Period, which began with the signing of the CPA and extended for six months
thereafter.61
The CPA therefore contains all of the core elements of earned sovereignty. In essence,
using these three basic tools, Southern Sudan should be able to obtain some form of
increased sovereignty; that is, it can add to the bundle of sovereign rights it already holds.
The CPA is also interesting, however, because it illustrates utilization of at least two of
the so-called conditional elements of earned sovereignty: phased sovereignty and
conditional sovereignty.
Phased Sovereignty, the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions
over a specified period of time, can be seen throughout the CPA, wherein certain powers
are granted to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and, later, the fledgling
GOSS. This process was to be implemented along a timeline, beginning, as discussed
above, with the signature of the CPA and passing through a Pre-Interim Period, an
Interim Period, enactment of the Interim National Constitution (INC) and finally ending
in the Self-determination Referendum for the people of South Sudan. This is probably
the single greatest example of phased sovereignty in the CPA62 although whether
Southern Sudan will obtain full sovereignty is dependant upon the outcome of the
referendum. Other examples of phased sovereignty, that do not rely on the outcome of
the Self-determination Referendum, include conducting a census two years into the
Interim Period,63 enactment of the National Electoral Law within six months from the
start of the Interim Period, establishment of the National Electoral Commission within
one month after the adoption of the Law, and general and presidential elections to be held
not later than the end of the fourth year of the Interim Period,64 and establishment and
convening of the Council of States and the National Assembly within two weeks of the
adoption of the INC.65 At the outset, most of the provisions of the CPA were to happen
within specified timeframes.66
59

See May CPA Monitor, supra note 38 at para. 11 (“President Bashir visited Juba and Rumbek on 14
February 2006 for the first time since Dr. Garang’s funeral [….] During his speech, President Bashir noted
the right of the people of Southern Sudan to vote freely in the referendum in 2011.”).
60
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 1.
61
See Machakos Protocol, supra note 36 at paras. 2-2.5.
62
See Machakos Protocol, supra note 36 at para. 2.5; see also Implementation Modalities of the Protocol
on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 1.
63
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 8.
64
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 9.
65
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activities 11-12.
66
See, e.g., Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 (Review of the
feasibility of the dates set for census and elections (Activity 10), Preparation of the constitutional text by
the NCRC (Activity 42), submission and approval of the CPA to the National Assembly and the National
Liberation Council (Activity 40), establishment of an inclusive Southern Sudan Constitutional Drafting
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A number of them have come to pass, though not always as scheduled. President Bashir
signed the INC into law on July 9, 2005, and the three-member Presidency was
inaugurated that day. The National Legislature, which consists of the National Assembly
and the Council of States, was formed and convened on August 31, 2005. The
Government of National Unity (GNU) was established by four decrees issued by
President Bashir on September 20, 2005 (this was done after considerable delay), and
was formed largely in accordance with the CPA power-sharing formula. Members of the
GNU were sworn in on September 22, 2005. On December 7, 2005, President Bashir
established the National Judicial Service Commission. The enactment of the National
Judicial Service Commission Act properly passed through the National Assembly but
bypassed the NCRC. There was considerable difficulty with the establishment of the
NCRC.67
Conditional sovereignty, where certain benchmarks must be met for increased sovereign
authority to be conferred upon the substate entity in a quid pro quo fashion, is also
evident in the CPA. For example, the Council of Ministers will be established prior to
elections and within thirty days after the adoption of the INC.68 It therefore follows that
the INC had to be adopted by both parties for the Council of Ministers to be established.
The final optional element, constrained sovereignty, is not explicitly used in the CPA
because it does not provide for restrictions on the sovereignty of Southern Sudan
following the determination of final status. One may infer from the text of the Machakos
Protocol and the CPA that, should Southern Sudan decide not to remain part of Sudan in
the 2011 referendum it will be entitled to the entire bundle of rights granted to a
sovereign nation.
The argument could be made, however, that prior to the 2011 referendum a form of
constrained sovereignty is in effect in Southern Sudan. This is similar to the current
situation in Bougainville, which will be discussed below. The most striking examples of
Committee (SSCDC) (Activity 47), establishment of the first Southern Sudan Assembly (Activity 48),
establishment of the Council of Ministers of the Government of Southern Sudan (Activity 51),
establishment of the Judiciary of Southern Sudan (Activity 52), appointment of the President and Justices
of Southern Sudan Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and Judges of Other Courts (Activity 53),
establishment of state legislatures (Activity 55), establishment of the Abyei Area Council (Activity 56),
drafting and adoption of the state constitutions (Activity 58), and establishment of state Council of
Ministers (Activity 59)).
67
See May CPA Monitor, supra note 38 at paras. 13, 15, 16, 23, 30, and 38-41; see also The CPA Monitor:
Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA, November 2006 [hereinafter November CPA Monitor],
paras. 1, 3-7, available at http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/cpaMonitor_nov06.pdf
(last visited January 30, 2007) (The NCRC originally prepared the INC. President Bashir re-established the
NCRC by decree on 7 January 2006. Its mandate has been controversial, as President Bashir’s decree did
not mention some functions assigned to the NCRC by the CPA. The NCRC published a new Presidential
decree on 8 October 2006 which was originally dated 6 June 2006. This decree confirmed the mandate of
the NCRC to prepare legal instruments as required to give effect to the CPA and confirmed a number of
additional functions, including preparing model State constitutions in compliance with the INC and the
Interim Constitution of South Sudan (ICSS)).
68
See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, at Activity 18.
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the use of constrained sovereignty in the pre-referendum period are the degree of control
over Southern Sudan that is exercised by the GNU in Khartoum, as discussed above, and
the integration of SPLA forces into Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).69
B.

Bougainville

The Bougainville peace agreement between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and separatists on
the island of Bougainville is probably one of the most comprehensive and successful
applications of earned sovereignty. The peace agreement, signed in 2001 in Arawa, put
an end to a conflict on the island that had taken the lives of between 15,000 and 20,000
people. It also provided a framework for the election of an autonomous Bougainville
Government.70 The PNG Government gazetted an agreed Constitution for the
Autonomous Region of Bougainville in December 2004 that paved the way for elections
and the establishment of an autonomous Bougainville Government.71 In June 2005
Bougainville elected a president for its new autonomous government. This election was
seen as a key test of the 2001 peace agreement.72
An in-depth examination of the Bougainville peace agreement shows that the
stakeholders made use of all the elements of earned sovereignty. The text of the
agreement includes provisions outlining how sovereignty is to be shared, providing for
institution building, and includes a strategy for achieving final status. It uses the means
of phased sovereignty, constrained sovereignty, and to a lesser extent conditional
sovereignty to arrive at the endpoint of determining the final status of Bougainville.
Two “lists” comprise the shared sovereignty component. Section 5 of the peace
agreement delineates a two list system for dividing powers and functions between the
National Government and the autonomous Bougainville Government.73 According to the
peace agreement the two lists will be “as exhaustive as possible” in outlining all the
powers and functions of government, and for any issues that arise during the drafting of
constitutional amendments, the agreement provides that the parties will consult and agree
69

May CPA Monitor, supra note 38 at para 10 (The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) Act was endorsed by the
National Assembly on 17 January 2006. The Act covers the establishment of the JIUs, their mandate, areas
of deployment, uniform and common doctrine. It also specified the rules relating to the formation of the
Joint Defense Board (JDB) and its mandate); see also The CPA Monitor: Monthly Report on the
Implementation of the CPA, December 2006 [hereinafter December CPA Monitor], paras. 308-316,
available at http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/cpaMonitor_dec06.pdf (last visited
January 30, 2007) (Discussing the current status of the JIU Act, JIU strength and composition, and the
JDB).
70
See
Country
profile:
Papua
New
Guinea,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/country_profiles/1246074.stm, (last visited Sep. 29, 2006). See also, Australian Government
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs
and
Trade:
Bougainville
Peace
Process,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/ (last visited Sep. 26, 2006).
71
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Bougainville Peace Process, available
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/, (last visited Sep. 26, 2006).
72
President Elected in Bougainville, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4612685.stm (last visited
Sep. 26, 2006).
73
See Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug. 30, 2001, Papua N.G.-Bougainville, § 5, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement].
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on how they shall be resolved.74 It further provides that the constitutional laws
implementing the peace agreement will supply a mechanism to deal with overlap and
conflict between the two lists.75 The first list, which is provided in the peace agreement
itself, demarcates the functions and powers of the National Government.76 The “list” of
powers and functions provided to the autonomous Bougainville Government is not
actually a list, but rather a catch-all provision stating that the autonomous Bougainville
Government shall exercise the powers and functions not already delegated to the National
Government, beginning with those available to provincial governments under the
National Constitution, and to be developed while drafting the Constitutional laws
implementing the peace agreement.77 Policing functions will also be divided between
the autonomous Bougainville Government and the National Government.78 These
examples show how the state, in this case Papua New Guinea, shares sovereignty with the
substate entity, the autonomous Bougainville Government, prior to the determination of
final status by referendum.79
The institution building component of earned sovereignty is satisfied in the peace
agreement itself by an interesting mechanism that allows the government of an
autonomous Bougainville to gradually assume control of various responsibilities. One of
the best examples of institution building in the Bougainville peace agreement comes in
the provisions related to the establishment of the Bougainville Public Service. The
National Government’s Public Service apparatus will remain in Bougainville in the
beginning, and then will undergo a transitional period that will result in their conversion
in to a Bougainville Public Service, responsible to the autonomous Bougainville
Government.80 Similar provisions apply to the Bougainville Police and the Bougainville
Correctional Institutional Services (CIS).81 In an interestingly hands-off approach on the
part of the government of Papua New Guinea, the peace agreement provides that the
costs of maintaining the post-agreement, pre-referendum level of autonomy in
Bougainville will be shared by the autonomous Bougainville Government and the
National Government.82 The autonomous Bougainville Government will be able to
collect Bougainville taxes as well as, by agreement, certain National-level taxes.83

74

See
id
at
paras.
47-48,
available
at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_04_06.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007),
75
See id at para. 49.
76
See id at para. 51.
77
See id at para. 52.
78
See
id
at
paras.
209-239,
available
at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_10_12.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
79
See
id
at
para.
312,
available
at
http://www/usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_C_F.html#C (last visited Jan. 30, 2007)
(Though para. 312 is not marked, its location can be inferred from the various sub-sections that fall
between paras. 311 and 315).
80
See
id
at
paras
201-208,
available
at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_10_12.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
81
See id at paras 209-262.
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See
id
at
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136,
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at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_07_09.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
83
See id at para. 146.
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In a briefing to the UN Security Council, Assistant Secretary General Danilo Turk, of the
UN Department of Political Affiars, showed the international community’s continued
commitment to institution building in Bougainville, as evidenced in a May 2004 UN
Security Council press release.84 Mr. Türk’s statements show that the Bougainville
Interim Provisional Government received support from the Law and Justice Programs of
AusAID, NZAID, the Australian Federal Police, the United Nations Observer Mission in
Bougainville (UNOMB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).85 Statements from the representatives of Germany,
Chile, Spain, Romania, Brazil, France, Philippines, China, Angola, the United Kingdom,
the Russian Federation, Pakistan, New Zealand (speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands
Forum Group), Japan, and Fiji underlined the importance of the international
community’s continued involvement in institution building to support the peace
process.86
In particular, AusAID’s Framework for AusAID Assistance to Bougainville 2004-2008
outlined three broad objectives for Australian aid to Bougainville: helping implement
autonomy and re-establish public administration; improving essential service delivery;
and expanding agricultural income-generating opportunities.87 It also provides funding
through the Governance and Implementation Fund.88 Over the medium to long-term,
Australia expects that this fund will contribute toward improved public expenditure
management and development outcomes, public sector reforms, better coordination of
donor assistance, and transfer of essential powers from the PNG Government to
Bougainville consistent with the autonomy provision of the Bougainville peace
agreement.89 These objectives fit well within the core earned sovereignty element of
institution building.
The use of the core elements of shared sovereignty and institution building will hopefully
allow the autonomous Bougainville Government to obtain the basic skills necessary to
effectively assert itself as either an autonomous or sovereign entity upon determination of
Bougainville’s final status in the upcoming referendum. In an effort to ensure that the
necessary skills are acquired in a timely and effective fashion the Bougainville peace
agreement implements, to varying degrees, all three of the so-called optional elements of
earned sovereignty: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained
sovereignty. As was acknowledged by Williams and Jannotti Pecci, use of the optional
elements are not necessary in every case of earned sovereignty.90 They do however, in
this case, provide useful tools to facilitate the interim period before a decision on final
status for Bougainville.
84

See United Nations Security Council press release, SC/8086 (2004).
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Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 367 (Regarding phased sovereignty. The author contends
that this belief, that phased sovereignty need not be present in all instances of earned sovereignty, extends
to all three of the optional elements.).
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The Bougainville peace agreement relies to a greater extent upon phased sovereignty, and
possibly constrained sovereignty, than it does upon conditional sovereignty. The quid
pro quo arrangements are fewer and farther between. In the case of Bougainville, the
timer is set for between ten and fifteen years, nearly all the ingredients have been added,
and the most important question that remains, to be decided in the upcoming referendum,
is Bougainville’s final status.
The “timer” of phased sovereignty is evident throughout the Bougainville peace
agreement. One of the “three pillars” of the agreement is the right of Bougainvilleans to
hold a referendum to decide their final status, which will be held no sooner than ten
years, and no later than fifteen years, after the election of an autonomous Bougainville
Government.91 The gradual assumption of powers and duties by the autonomous
Bougainville Government in the areas of Public Service, Police Service, and CIS, also
shows use of phased sovereignty.92
The Bougainville peace agreement also contains the quid pro quo arrangement that
embodies conditional sovereignty. According to the Bougainville peace agreement, in
order for the referendum on Bougainville independence to take place the conditions of
“weapons disposal” and “good governance” must be met. The autonomous Bougainville
Government’s success in meeting these conditions will allow the referendum to proceed
within the specified timeframe, at least 10 but no more than 15 years after the signing of
the Bougainville peace agreement.93
These conditions are not terribly onerous, as long as the stakeholders remain committed
to the peace process. Weapons disposal has been accomplished under international
monitoring,94 and “good governance” is so vague that it will be difficult for the
autonomous Bougainville Government to fail as long as the National Government
remains committed to the peace process, and especially to institution building in
autonomous Bougainville.
The implementation of the weapons disposal programs in Bougainville has been almost a
textbook example of conditional sovereignty. “With the completion of the second phase
of weapons collection, the Bougainville peace process could proceed with the remaining
tasks, including finalization of the constitution and the holding of elections, leading to the
establishment of an autonomous government […].”95 The United Nations Political Office
in Bougainville’s verification and certification of the completion of stage II of the
Weapons Disposal Plan in July 2003 triggered the constitutional process of bringing the
Constitutional Amendment and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville into
91

See Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 73 at Introduction, Pillar 2.
See id at paras. 201-262.
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See id at para. 312.
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Bougainville Peace Process: History of the Peace Process, Australian Government Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/ (last visited July 9,
2006) (“In May 2005, U.N.O.M.B. declared the weapons disposal program complete and verified the
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full operation.96 As of May 2004 the Bougainville Constitutional Commission was
working on a draft constitution for the autonomous Bougainville, which was to be
submitted to the Bougainville Constitutional Assembly (BCA) in June 2004. Following
adoption by the BCA it would be submitted to the National Government of Papua New
Guinea for endorsement, which was expected to take place by the end of July.97 The
Bougainville Interim Provincial Government had also started preparations for the election
of the autonomous Bougainville Government, including establishment of the Ministry for
Peace and Autonomy.98
The 10 to 15 year period prior to the referendum on Bougainville independence also acts
as a form of constrained sovereignty. It could be argued that the current, pre-referendum
status of the autonomous Bougainville is a test of constrained sovereignty, giving
Bougainvilleans an idea of what it would be like to remain an autonomous province of
Papua New Guinea. After this limited period of constrained sovereignty the people of
Bougainville will have the opportunity to choose whether to remain autonomous or seek
independence from the National government.99 Should the benefits of continued
autonomy outweigh those of full independence at that time a form of entirely consensual,
permanent, increased constitutional autonomy could result, based in constrained
sovereignty.
The Bougainville peace agreement is one of the best, if not the best, embodiment of an
earned sovereignty approach to conflict resolution. The parties share sovereignty over
Bougainville for a period of time as its institutions are developed, therefore satisfying two
of the three core elements of earned sovereignty. The parties also use all three of the socalled optional elements, to varying degrees, as means by which to share sovereignty and
build the nascent institutions of the autonomous Bougainville. The 10-15 year waiting
period prior to the referendum on final status is evidence of the use of phased
sovereignty. It is a particularly good example of phased sovereignty, in fact, because it
provides a roadmap for the transfer of increased power and responsibility from the
national government to the government of autonomous Bougainville, particularly in the
areas of the Public Service, Police Service, and CIS. Bougainville can move forward
along the path to the referendum on independence, using the method of conditional
sovereignty, due to the success of the weapons disposal program. Until the determination
of final status, which will satisfy the third core element of earned sovereignty, the
autonomous Bougainville will exist in a kind of limbo of constrained sovereignty, as
powers are slowly devolved from national institutions to those of the province. For these
reasons, Bougainville is probably one of the best relatively recent examples of the use of
earned sovereignty to determine the final status of an emerging state at the end of a
conflict.
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C.

Aceh

The peace agreement signed between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM)100 is relatively recent example of earned sovereignty moving at
breakneck speed. The conflict between the Indonesian Government and GAM has cost
over 9,000 lives since its beginning in 1976.101 However, since the signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the GoI and GAM on August 15, 2005,
steady progress has been made.102 When taken together, the text of the MoU and its thusfar successful implementation shows a valuable perspective on the application of the
various elements of earned sovereignty, particularly the use of constrained sovereignty to
end a seemingly intractable conflict.103
The use of shared sovereignty in resolving the GoI/GAM conflict begins in the preamble
of the August 15, 2005, MoU. The second paragraph commits the parties to, “creating
conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested
through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia.”104 This statement offers an initial hint that the GoI and GAM
will share competencies in the post-MoU environment. The hint is confirmed in Section
1, which discusses the Law on the Governing of Aceh that had to, according to the MoU,
enter into force no later than March 31, 2006 and be promulgated by the GoI.105 The
principals on which the Law on the Governing of Aceh should be based are laid out in
Paragraph 1.1.2 of the MoU and call for such measures as granting authority to the
Acehnese government in all public affairs except in foreign affairs, external defense,
national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion;106 that the
GoI will consult with the government of Aceh and obtain its consent from the Acehnese
legislature on international agreements that relate to matters of special interest to Aceh;107
decisions by Indonesia’s legislature regarding Aceh will be taken in consultation with and
with the consent of Aceh’s legislature;108 and, finally, that administrative measures taken
by the GoI regarding Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent
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of the head of Aceh’s administration.109 According to the MoU, the Law on the
Governing of Aceh would allow the Acehnese people to have the opportunity to choose
many national symbols, such as the determination of the name of Aceh, the titles of
senior elected officials, and the regional symbol, flag, crest and hymn.110 The GoI is also
obligated under the MoU to facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties
that meet national criteria. It is the GoI’s responsibility under the MoU to create the
political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh.111
The MoU also provides the Acehnese government the opportunity to self-govern in a
number of other substantive ways, particularly in economic matters. For example, Aceh
has the right to raise funds with external loans, set interest rates beyond those set by
Indonesia’s Central Bank, raise taxes to fund official internal activities, conduct trade and
business internally and internationally, and seek foreign direct investment and tourism.112
Aceh also has jurisdiction over living natural resources in its surrounding territorial
waters.113
Importantly, under the MoU Aceh is entitled to retain 70 percent of the revenues from all
current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in Acehnese territory
and in its surrounding territorial seas.114 In order to develop these resources, the MoU
grants Aceh the right to conduct the development and administration of all seaports and
airports within its territory, the right to enjoy free trade with all other parts of the
Republic of Indonesia, and direct and unhindered sea and air access to foreign
countries.115
The court system of Aceh is also touched by shared sovereignty. Under the MoU, an
independent and impartial court system will be established for Aceh within the judicial
system of the Republic of Indonesia.116 The appointment of the Chief of the organic
police forces, and prosecutors, shall be approved by the head of the Aceh administration,
which will also consult in their recruitment and training in compliance with the
applicable national standards.117 These provisions in particular show a concrete example
of shared sovereignty, with both the Aceh government and the GoI participating in the
selection and training of the judiciary and forces of order.
As a separate and distinct entity, a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be
established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in order
to formulate and determine reconciliation measures.118
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On a level affecting former combatants directly, both the GoI and Acehnese authorities
will establish a Reintegration Fund under the administration of Aceh in order to facilitate
the reintegration of persons who participated in GAM activities, including former
combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians, into civil society.119 In
order to deal with unmet claims of those affected by the conflict the GoI and Aceh will
establish a Joint Settlement Commission.120 Former GAM combatants will also have the
right to seek employment in the organic police and organic military forces in Aceh
without discrimination and in conformity with national standards.121 These provisions
again show important instances of shared sovereignty between Aceh and the GoI.
Though many of these programs are to be administered by the government of Aceh, few
of them could be allowed or funded without the good graces of the GoI.
The MoU provides a number of specific provisions that would fall into the category of
institution building. These provisions are designed to help Aceh build its internal
institutions, and to supervise them as they gain competency. For example, the MoU
provides for outside auditors to verify the collection and allocation of revenues between
the GoI and Aceh. The auditors will communicate the results to the head of the Aceh
administration.122
The MoU also provides that both stakeholders will take part in the post-tsunami
reconstruction effort. In particular, GAM will nominate representatives to participate in
the commission established to help post-tsunami reconstruction, also known as the
BRR.123
From a legal and policy standpoint, one of the most important aspects of the MoU is the
extent to which it addresses the rule of law and a fair and efficient judicial system.
Section 1.4.2 of the MoU is therefore critical, in that it states, broadly, that the legislature
of Aceh will redraft its legal code on the basis of universal principles of human rights.124
Not only that, but the MoU goes so far as to dictate that a Human Rights Court will be
established for Aceh.125
One of the most important examples of institution building in the MoU is the
establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), an international body tasked with
a number of important responsibilities.126 The AMM successfully completed its mission
in December 2006.127 The MoU tasked the AMM with monitoring the demobilization
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and decommissioning of GAM, the relocation of non-organic military and police troops,
the reintegration of active GAM members, the human rights situation, and the “process of
legislation change.” It also provided that the AMM would provide assistance in the
human rights field, ruling on disputed amnesty cases, investigating and ruling on
complaints and alleged violations of the MoU, and establishing and maintaining liaison
and good cooperation with the parties.128 These provisions show not only a commitment
on the part of the two stakeholders to help Aceh attain a measure of self-sufficiency; they
also show the degree to which the international community, in the form of the EU and
ASEAN, was committed to a lasting political settlement.
The third core element of earned sovereignty, determination of final status, is
contemplated by the MoU. The first example comes in the Preamble, which specifically
states that “The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the
government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic
process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. [Emphasis
added]”129 This statement indicates that Aceh’s final status, at least under the MoU, is to
remain within the Republic of Indonesia. The MoU does not provide a referendum or
other mechanism for determining possible Acehnese independence.130
This conclusion is supported by the MoU’s operational paragraphs. For example,
Paragraph 1.2.3 states that free and fair local elections will be organized under the new
Lao on the Governing Aceh,131 which is a law set to be enacted by the GoI. Paragraph
1.2.6 provides for full participation of the Acehnese people in local and national
elections in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. [Emphasis
added]132 The Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated, seemingly, by the
GoI.133 Paragraph 1.2.1 of the MoU specifically states that the GoI will facilitate the
establishment of Aceh-based political parties that meet national criteria.134 Additionally,
the Acehnese court system will be set up within the judicial system of the Republic of
Indonesia.135 Paragraph 3.2.1 confirms that the Acehnese people are citizens of the
Republic of Indonesia.136 Finally, Paragraph 1.1.2 sets out the specific areas in which the
GoI retains competence.137 Though the MoU does not tot provide for Acehnese
independence it does provide Aceh with final status and, therefore, satisfies the third core
element of earned sovereignty.
The MoU also contains all three of the optional elements of earned sovereignty. The
dates set in the MoU when the government of Aceh will obtain competence in various
areas shows phased sovereignty. Conditional sovereignty is shown in the MoU’s
128

See id para. 5.1(a)-(h).
MoU, supra note 21 at Preamble, para. 2.
130
See generally MoU, supra note 21.
131
See MoU, supra note 21 at para. 1.2.3.
132
See id, para. 1.2.6.
133
See id para. 1.1.2(a).
134
See id para. 1.2.1.
135
See id, para. 1.4.3.
136
See id para. 3.2.1.
137
See generally id para. 1.1.2.
129

24

disarmament provisions. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the restrictions on the
competency of the future Acehnese government, as outlined in the MoU, provide an
excellent example of constrained sovereignty.
Phased sovereignty is best exemplified in the MoU in the provisions involving elections.
Paragraph 1.2.2 shows that, upon signing the MoU, the people of Aceh had the right to
nominate candidates during elections to be held in Aceh in April 2006.138 Elections were
to take place in April 2006 for the head of the Aceh administration, with elections for an
Acehnese legislature coming in 2009.139 Finally, the legislature of Aceh, prior to 2009,
will not be entitled to enact any laws without the consent of the head of the Aceh
administration.140
Conditional sovereignty and its hallmark quid pro quo arrangement plays a smaller role
in the MoU than in the Sudan and Bougainville peace agreements. The MoU’s best
example of conditional sovereignty is expressed in Paragraphs 4.2 to 4.6, which concern
the decommissioning of GAM’s arms, ammunition, and explosives congruent with the
relocation of non-organic military and police forces. Paragraph 4.4 stated that the
decommissioning of GAM armaments would begin on September 15, 2005, would be
executed in four stages, and would be concluded by December 31, 2005. Under
paragraph 4.6, the relocation of non-organic military and police forces was set to begin
on September 15, 2005. It would be executed in four stages in parallel with GAM’s
decommissioning “immediately after each stage has been verified by the AMM,” and
concluded by December 31, 2005.141 The language of the agreement therefore showed
that GAM would decommission its arms in four stages and, as each stage was verified by
the AMM, the GoI would relocate non-organic military and police personnel. This
arrangement showed that the MoU incorporated a form of conditional sovereignty, albeit
to a rather limited degree.
The prevalence of constrained sovereignty in the MoU makes it a particularly interesting
document in terms of earned sovereignty. In summary, the MoU conveys to the people
of Aceh an expanded bundle of rights to self-government, while maintaining important
links, including constitutional links, to the Republic of Indonesia. The discussions of
shared sovereignty and final status, supra, illustrate this point. The preamble of the MoU
reaffirms Aceh’s constitutional ties to the Republic of Indonesia and highlights
Indonesia’s status as a unitary state.142 The burden fell upon the GoI to promulgate the
Law on the Governing of Aceh,143 upon which the entire peace agreement depends.144
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Even once that milestone is accomplished any Aceh-based political parties must meet
national criteria.145 These provisions, which form the four corners of a concession on the
part of GAM in which it foregoes its demand for independence,146 are wonderful
examples of an effective use of constrained sovereignty.
In this instance circumstances were such that both parties were able to come to an
agreement in order to end the conflict following the tragedy of the December 2004
tsunami. The method chosen by the parties included all of the elements of earned
sovereignty to various degrees. The MoU includes provisions for shared sovereignty and
institution building as well as using the so-called “optional” elements of earned
sovereignty. Aceh’s final status, at least for the moment, may be inferred from the text of
the agreement, and it provides an excellent example of constrained sovereignty. In the
very particular context of the Aceh conflict, the parties agreed that constrained
sovereignty could provide a mutually beneficial outcome, even though it fell short of
Acehnese independence.
V.

Conclusion

It therefore appears that even a pared-down version of earned sovereignty, which uses the
core elements but may not use the optional elements, provides a useful tool for attaining
peace between states and susbstate entities. The CPA uses all of the core elements but
does not use all of the optional elements, particularly constrained sovereignty. The
Bougainville peace agreement follows a similar pattern. In both cases the peace
agreements themselves contain no true restraints upon the bundle of rights the substate
entity may eventually obtain, and the final status of Southern Sudan or an autonomous
Bougainville may well be full-fledged statehood. The MoU between the Government of
Indonesia and GAM takes a completely different approach and uses all the core and
optional elements of earned sovereignty. The use of constrained sovereignty, wherein
Aceh’s final status is a form of heightened autonomy instead of statehood, is of particular
importance in the MoU. Indeed, it has allowed the peace process to proceed successfully
through the completion of the AMM’s mission. It thus appears that the most important
elements of earned sovereignty to apply are the core elements – shared sovereignty,
institution building, and determination of final status. The optional elements, however,
may be used to a great extent, sparingly, or not at all depending on the particular
circumstances of the conflict. As illustrated by the MoU, the optional elements retain
their usefulness as tools to help implement and secure the use of the core elements of
earned sovereignty. In doing so, they ensure earned sovereignty’s continued usefulness
as a tool of conflict resolution.
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